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Trump and the Bond
Market
Why a Flight From U.S. Treasuries Is Unlikely
Sandy Brian Hager
KEVIN LAMARQUE / REUTERS
U.S. President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin at the
Treasury Department in Washington,  April 2017.
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign frightened bond
market investors around the world. Trump pledged to slash
federal income taxes and spend up to $1 trillion upgrading
the United States’ infrastructure. Investors worried that his
victory would lead to massive federal deficits and runaway
inflation, eroding the value of their holdings. The title of an
April 2016 article in Forbes captured the mood: “President
Donald Trump Would Destroy the Bond Market.” 
The anxiety was particularly acute among foreign investors,
who own around 40 percent of the $14 trillion worth of
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities. When Trump hinted
during the campaign that he would “make a deal” with
creditors to reduce the value of their Treasuries, pundits
asked whether the Chinese and Japanese central banks would
begin to sour on the U.S. debt they had been stockpiling as
part of their foreign exchange reserves. 
To be sure, foreign confidence in U.S. Treasuries had wavered
long before the 2016 election. In recent years, budget
deficits, quantitative easing, and the political dramas
surrounding the debt ceiling and other fiscal issues had put
the creditworthiness of the U.S. federal government in doubt.
Still, the prospect of Trump’s victory introduced a new
dynamic altogether, leading some observers to fear that a
panicked selloff of Treasury securities could be around the
corner.
The stakes were high. The U.S. Treasuries market is the
largest and most liquid financial market in the world, and as
the world’s premier low-risk assets, U.S. Treasuries are a
benchmark against which most other assets are priced. U.S.
regulators require banks to hold Treasuries as part of the safe
assets on their balance sheets, and investors turn to
Treasuries as safe havens in uncertain times. Treasuries have
also been the linchpin of U.S. global financial power: steady
foreign demand for them has allowed the United States to
cheaply finance big deficits.
In the week after the November 8 election, around $1 trillion
was wiped off of global bond markets as investors moved
away from U.S. and other government debt. But that was no
panic, and for a few reasons, U.S. Treasuries will probably
remain the world’s premier risk-free asset. The first is a lack
of attractive alternatives from other governments: the U.S.
bond market is the best of a questionable batch. The second is
that the big companies and superwealthy families in the
United States hold a disproportionately large share of the
country’s domestically owned public debt and would resist
policies that would disrupt the bond market.
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U.S. President Donald Trump celebrating with Congressional Republicans after the U.S. Congress passed a tax
overhaul, Washington, December 2017.
NOWHERE TO RUN
The U.S. economy can seem dysfunctional. But investment
decisions are always relative, and compared with the
alternatives, U.S. Treasuries look like beacons of stability.
There are two challengers that might supplant U.S.
Treasuries in the long term—eurozone government debt and
Chinese government debt. Neither is especially attractive.
Eurozone bond markets are still reeling from the sovereign
debt crisis in southern Europe, driven by Italy’s broken
banking system and the prospect of a Greek default. The
United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has
cast further doubt on the future of the European project and
the monetary union it supports. And unemployment, slow
growth, and inequality have created the potential for another
populist wave on the continent, which would compromise the
security of eurozone government debt.
If not the eurozone, then what about China? As part of its
recent financial reforms, Beijing has sought to open up
foreign access to China’s interbank bond market. The reforms
are meant to promote the international use of the renminbi
(RMB) and increase China’s global financial influence. In
November 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced
that it would include the RMB alongside the U.S. dollar, the
euro, the yen, and the pound sterling in the basket of
international currencies used to value the Special Drawing
Right.
Yet China has a long way to go before it can rival the United
States as the world’s top source of safe assets. Investors still
fret over China’s opaque institutions, its slowing economic
growth, its volatile stock market, its use of capital controls,
and its growing piles of private and public debt. The size of
the Chinese bond market, which is worth about $4 trillion,
pales in comparison with that of the U.S. Treasuries market,
and foreign ownership of China’s public debt remains very
low. And despite Beijing’s efforts, the RMB’s use in
international transactions fell between 2015 and 2016 by
almost 30 percent. All of this uncertainty reinforces the
relatively safe status of the U.S. Treasuries market.
As emerging markets drive global growth in the coming years,
the value of the dollar will probably undergo a gradual fall.
Central banks in Beijing and Tokyo could limit their losses by
selling some of their U.S. Treasuries now. But that too is
unlikely, thanks to a dynamic that the economist Eswar
Prasad has called the “dollar trap.” By selling their
Treasuries, Beijing and Tokyo could set off a panicked flight
from the Treasuries market—and that would be bad news for
big exporters such as China and Japan, since it would further
weaken the value of the dollar and make U.S. exports more
competitive.
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The headquarters of the People's Bank of China in Beijing, June 2013.
MONEY TALKS
There is another reason that U.S. Treasuries will likely retain
their safe status: their powerful domestic owners will seek to
protect them.
In recent years, domestic ownership of the United States’
public debt has become increasingly unequal: the richest
American families and the biggest financial corporations have
acquired a disproportionate share of U.S. Treasuries. Among
U.S. households, the share of public debt held by the richest
one percent climbed from around 20 percent in 1969 to 56
percent in 2013. Meanwhile, in the corporate sector, the top
2,500 companies’ share of the debt jumped from 65 percent in
the period between 1977 and 1981 to 82 percent in the period
between 2006 to 2010. Highly concentrated mutual funds
have expanded their holdings of U.S. Treasuries as pension
funds, which are more widely held, have lost some of their
share. All of this has aligned the interests of the richest
Americans with those of the biggest financial firms.
This concentration of public debt is the result of the four-
decade evolution of what the economic sociologist Wolfgang
Streeck has called the “debt state.” In the case of the United
States, rising federal spending and stagnating federal
revenues—themselves a result of increasingly regressive tax
policies—have produced ever-deeper levels of public debt.
The United States’ wealthies families and biggest companies
have waged a successful political battle to reduce their tax
burdens; they now pay less tax relative to their income than
they did a few decades ago. That has produced more
inequality—and more savings for the rich to invest in rising
public debt. In effect, the federal government is borrowing
from powerful domestic groups instead of taxing them. If
Trump ever seriously threatened he safe status of U.S.
Treasury securities, these powerful domestic owners would
probably rise up in opposition.  
At this point, there are few signs that Trump will try to
disrupt the debt state. To the contrary: the tax reforms
backed by his administration could add up to $1.5 trillion to
the deficit over the next decade. Because the bulk of the tax
cuts will benefit top earners, the reforms would further
entrench the power of domestic groups with interests in a
stable Treasuries market.
IN THE LONG RUN
This assessment applies only to the short term. In the longer
run, a financial crash, a natural disaster, domestic unrest, or
a major war could quickly bring about systemic changes,
unraveling the global financial order and ending the U.S.
Treasury market’s role as a safe haven. More optimistically,
Trump could deliver a sustained economic recovery, reducing
the U.S. deficit and placing the onus on other governments to
supply the global financial system with safe assets. Wouldn’t
that, too, disrupt the position of U.S. Treasuries?
Perhaps. But there is reason to be skeptical of Washington’s
ability to produce such an outcome. First, Trump’s proposals
for recovery have hinged mainly on his pledge to increase
infrastructure spending. With such large tax cuts in the
offing, however, it is unlikely that Republicans will throw
their support behind an expensive infrastructure plan.
Second, Trump’s fiscal strategy appears to contradict the
other component of his blueprint for growth: a weaker dollar.
Increased deficit spending could lead to rising interest rates,
which attract capital inflows. To the detriment of U.S.
exporters, those inflows would strengthen the dollar and
widen the current account deficit far more than the tax cuts
would on their own.
Nor is this all. The political economists Shimshon Bichler and
Jonathan Nitzan have shown that since the 1940s, rising
employment rates tend to be followed by falling pretax
corporate profits and falling stock prices relative to wages.
Unemployment is already falling, and if Trump delivers on his
promises to create even more jobs, profits and the stock
market would fall even further than they would otherwise.
Having appointed the wealthiest cabinet in U.S. history,
Trump will likely be reluctant to aggressively pursue policies
with such potentially detrimental consequences for the
superrich.
Domestic ownership of the United States’ public debt has
become increasingly unequal.
Bichler and Nitzan identify yet another factor that might
dampen enthusiasm for a Trump-style recovery: the effect of
employment growth on interest rates. Since the 1960s, they
note, “employment growth has become a nearly perfect five-
year leading predictor for interest rates.” As employment rose
in the 1960s and 1970s, interest rates climbed; since the early
1980s, both employment growth and interest rates have
fallen. Substantial growth in employment today could send
interest rates soaring and bring an end to the bull market that
cheap credit has encouraged.
Trump’s election made investors justifiably nervous. But a
mass exodus from the U.S. Treasuries market is unlikely, both
because the United States remains the most relatively safe
investment option in a perilous world and because Trump’s
policies will entrench the power of the superrich owners of
Treasuries. The existence of an influential bloc of domestic
owners should offer some solace to foreign investors rattled
by the new administration’s nationalist rhetoric. But perhaps
the main lesson for the holders of U.S. Treasuries is that the
inertia in the global financial system is strong—even in the
face of a change like Trump.
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